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Quantum secret sharing allows each player to have classical information for secret sharing in
quantum mechanical ways. In this work, we construct a class of quantum states on which players
can quantumly perform secret sharing secure against dishonest players as well as eavesdropper. We
here call them the genuine secret-sharing states. In addition, we show that if N players share an
N-party genuine secret-sharing state, then arbitrary M players out of the total players can share an
M -party genuine secret-sharing state by means of local operations and classical communication on
the state. We also define the distillable rate with respect to the genuine secret-sharing state, and
explain the connection between the distillable rate and the relative entropy of entanglement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing [1, 2] is a way of allocating a secret
among players, and a sufficient number of players must
cooperate to restore the secret. To be more specific, in
a (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme, a dealer dis-
tributes a secret to n players, and k or more players can
reconstruct the secret if they collaborate, but fewer than
k players cannot do so, where k ≤ n. Because of this fea-
ture, secret sharing can be used to deal with important
and sensitive information.
We remark that quantum mechanics can provide us
with unconditionally secure secret sharing. For example,
there is a quantum protocol [3] based on the Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state [4] in which each player can
obtain a classical bit for (n, n)-threshold secret sharing.
More precisely, if N players including a dealer share an
N -qubit GHZ state, then they can carry out an (N −
1, N − 1)-threshold secret sharing through the protocol.
As a matter of fact, this secret-sharing protocol can be
considered as an natural generalization of the Bell-state
based quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol [5].
Even though two players can securely share a secret
key through the Bell state, there is a specific class of
states on which perfectly secure QKD can be performed.
The states in the class are called the private states [6, 7].
In a similar way to the private states in QKD, we can
naturally ask the following question, what kinds of quan-
tum states are required to accomplish a secure (n, n)-
threshold secret sharing? In Ref. [8], this question has
already been considered, and the quantum states, called
the secret-sharing states, have been suggested as an an-
swer to the question. It has been shown that if players
share a secret-sharing state, then each player can have
a classical bit for secret sharing, which is secure against
any external eavesdropper. However, dishonest players,
who have a fatal impact on the security of secret sharing,
were not sufficiently considered in Ref. [8]. In particular,
we can find secret-sharing states that provide each legit-
imate player with a secret bit, which is insecure against
dishonest players, as we will see below. In other words,
secret sharing is not in general guaranteed on the secret-
sharing states.
To see this, we first look at the secret-sharing condi-
tions presented in Ref. [8]: (i) The probability distribu-
tions of the players’ secret bits must be unbiased, and
perfectly correlated, that is, if we let pI be the probabil-
ity that the N players get the random bit string I ∈ ZN2 ,
then pI = 1/2
N−1 for I with even parity and pI = 0
for I with odd parity. (ii) Any eavesdropper cannot ob-
tain any information about the players’ secret bits. For
1 ≤ i ≤ N , let Ai be the player Ai’s qubit system, and
A′i be the Ai’s another system with arbitrary dimension.
Then it has been shown [8] that ρAA′ is a quantum state
for secret sharing, that is, a secret-sharing state, where
A = A1 · · ·AN and A′ = A′1 · · ·A′N if and only if it is of
the form
1
2N−1
∑
I,J∈ZN2
even parity
|I〉
A
〈J | ⊗ UIσA′U †J ,
where σA′ is an arbitrary state, and the UI ’s are uni-
tary operators on the system A′. Here, A and A′ are
called the secret part and the shield part of the state,
respectively.
Suppose that three players share the following secret-
sharing state,
|Υ1〉AA′ =
1
2
(|000〉
A
|000〉
A′
+ |011〉
A
|000〉
A′
+ |101〉
A
|001〉
A′
+ |110〉
A
|001〉
A′
). (1)
Then we can readily see that if A3 is a dishonest player,
then he/she can perfectly know the other players’ secret
information by measuring his/her own secret part A3 and
shield part A′3 in the computational basis.
There also exists a secret-sharing state on which each
legitimate player has an insecure secret bit against dis-
honest players, even when dishonest players do not han-
dle their shield parts. It can be easily seen from the
following secret-sharing state,
|Υ2〉AA′ =
1
2
√
2
(|0000〉
A
|0000〉
A′
+ |0011〉
A
|0000〉
A′
+ |0101〉
A
|0000〉
A′
+ |0110〉
A
|0000〉
A′
+ |1001〉
A
|0000〉
A′
− |1010〉
A
|0000〉
A′
+ |1100〉
A
|0000〉
A′
− |1111〉
A
|0000〉
A′
).
2In this case, A3 and A4 can totally know the other play-
ers’ measurement outcomes by measuring their secret
parts A3A4 in the Bell basis, and they can also deceive
legitimate players as if they measure their secret parts in
the computational basis.
These problems are caused by the lack of sufficient con-
sideration on dishonest players in the secret-sharing con-
ditions. Hence, in this work, we modify the secret-sharing
conditions to fully cover (n, n)-threshold secret sharing
scenarios, and introduce a class of quantum states on
which each player can obtain a classical information for
secret sharing secure against not only eavesdropper but
also dishonest players. We call them the genuine secret-
sharing (GSS) states. In addition, we show that if N
players share an N -party GSS state, local operations and
classical communication (LOCC) enables any M players
out of the N players to share an M -party GSS state.
It can be an important property in a quantum network
connected by repeaters, since if the network consists of
a GSS state then players can share their own GSS state
with properly smaller size without providing any infor-
mation to the repeaters.
Furthermore, we define the distillable rate with respect
to the GSS state, and also show that the distillable rate
is upper bounded by the relative entropy of entangle-
ment [9, 10] between any bipartition of the total players.
By using this property, we discuss the irreducible GSS
state, which players cannot have additional information
for secret sharing from the shield part of the state via
LOCC.
Our paper is organized as follows. We introduce the
GSS state, and investigate its properties in Sec. II. We
define the GSS distillable rate in Sec. III, and give exam-
ples of the GSS states in Sec. IV. Finally, we conclude
our work with some discussion in Sec. V.
II. GENUINE SECRET-SHARING STATE AND
ITS PROPERTIES
To perfectly deal with (n, n)-threshold secret sharing
scenarios, we should also regard dishonest players as in-
ternal eavesdroppers who may conspire with an external
one. Thus we modify the secret-sharing conditions in
Ref. [8] as follows.
(i) The probability distributions of all players’ secret
information must be unbiased and perfectly corre-
lated.
(ii′) Any eavesdropper and dishonest players cannot get
any information about the legitimate players’ secret
information.
Since the modified conditions include the previous ones,
the quantum states on which players can have secret in-
formation that satisfies the modified conditions also have
the form of the secret-sharing states, but they must be
different from the states. The difference can be seen in
the following theorem. From now on, we let Ai be the
qudit system for all i to handle more general situations.
Theorem 1. ΥAA′ is a quantum state on which play-
ers can obtain secret information that obeys the modified
secret-sharing conditions by measuring their secret parts
in the computational basis if and only if for any bipartite
split {P1,P2} of the players with |P1| ≥ 2, the given state
ΥAA′ can be written as
1
dN−1
∑
I1I2,J1J2∈S
0
N
|I1I2〉P1P2 〈J1J2|
⊗
(
U I1
P′
1
V I2
A′
)
σA′
(
UJ1
P′
1
V J2
A′
)†
, (2)
where
S
t
N ≡

I = i1i2 · · · iN ∈ ZNd :
N∑
j=1
ij ≡ t (mod d)

 ,
Pk and P
′
k are the secret part and the shield part of Pk,
respectively, σA′ is an arbitrary state, and the
{
U I1
P′
1
}
and
{
V I2
A′
}
are unitary operators on the system P′1 and
A′, respectively. We call the state the GSS state.
Proof. We first give a proof of the forward direction. Sup-
pose that |Ψ〉
AA′E is a purification of ΥAA′ , that is,
|Ψ〉
AA′E =
∑
I∈ZN
d
√
pI |I〉A |ΨI〉A′E , (3)
where E is the reference system for the purification,
which can be considered as the system of the external
eavesdropper. From the condition (i), we have pI =
1/dN−1 for I ∈ S0N and pI = 0 for I /∈ S0N .
For a dealerAk, the worst case is that the other players
except one player Al (l 6= k) are dishonest. In this case,
by changing the order of the systems, we can rewrite the
state |Ψ〉
AA′E as follows:
|Ψ〉AkAlDA′E =
1√
d2
∑
ik,il∈Zd
|ik, il〉AkAl |ηik,il〉DA′E ,
where D is the secret part of the dishonest players and
|ηik,il〉DA′E =
1√
dN−3
∑
ξ∈S
−ik−il
N−2
|ξ〉
D
|Ψik,il,ξ〉A′E .
Let ik be Ak’s measurement outcome, then the quan-
tum state of dishonest players and eavesdropper after
the measurement becomes
Υik
DD′E =
1
d
∑
il∈Zd
trA′
k
A′
l
|ηik,il〉DA′E 〈ηik ,il | ,
whereD′ is the shield part of the dishonest players. Since
the eavesdropper and dishonest players cannot get any in-
formation about the Ak’s outcome, ΥikDD′E = Υi
′
k
DD′E for
3any ik, i
′
k ∈ Zd. We note that trA′kA′l |ηik,il〉DA′E 〈ηik,il |
is written as
1
dN−3
∑
ξ,ξ′∈S
−ik−il
N−2
|ξ〉
D
〈ξ′|
⊗ trA′
k
A′
l
|Ψik,il,ξ〉A′E 〈Ψik,il,ξ′ | .
Hence, Υik
DD′E = Υ
i′k
DD′E implies that if il and i
′
l satisfy
ik + il = i
′
k + i
′
l (mod d), then
trA′
k
A′
l
|ηik,il〉DA′E 〈ηik,il | = trA′kA′l |ηi′k,i′l〉DA′E 〈ηi′k,i′l | .
It follows from Hughston-Jozsa-Wooters theorem [11]
that for ik, i
′
k, il, i
′
l ∈ Zd, if ik+il = i′k+i′l (mod d), there
is a unitary operator U˜
ik,il→i
′
k,i
′
l
A′
k
A′
l
on the system A′kA
′
l such
that
U˜
ik,il→i
′
k,i
′
l
A′
k
A′
l
|Ψik,il,ξ〉A′E = |Ψi′k,i′l,ξ〉A′E (4)
for all ξ ∈ S−ik−ilN−2 .
Let us now divide the players into two parties, P1 and
P2, where |P1| =M ≥ 2. Then Eq. (3) can be rewritten
as
|Ψ〉
P1P2A
′E =
1√
dN−1
∑
I1I2∈S
0
N
|I1I2〉P1P2 |ΨI1I2〉A′E .
(5)
Here, all possible cases of secret sharing, including the
case where P2 is the party of the dishonest players, should
be considered. Thus, by symmetry and the Eq. (4), it can
be shown that there are unitary operators U I1
P′
1
and V I2
A′
such that
|ΨI1I2〉A′E = U I1P′
1
|ΨIα
1
I2〉A′E
= U I1
P′
1
V I2
A′
|Ψ00···0〉A′E
for I1 ∈ SαM and I2 ∈ Sd−αN−M , where Iα1 = 0 · · · 0α ∈ SαM .
For instance, if I = i1i2 · · · iN ∈ S0N , then
|ΨI〉A′E = U i1,i2A′
1
A′
2
U j2,i3
A′
2
A′
3
· · ·U jN−1,iN
A′N−1A
′
N
|Ψ00···0〉A′E , (6)
where U ik,il
A′
k
A′
l
=
(
U˜ ik,il→0,ik+il
A′
k
A′
l
)†
and jt ≡ i1 + · · · + it
(mod d). Therefore, if we let trA′ (|Ψ00···0〉 〈Ψ00···0|) =∑
x λx |φx〉E 〈φx| be its spectral decomposition, we have
|ΨI1I2〉A′E =
∑
x
√
λxU
I1
P′
1
V I2
A′
|ψx〉A′ |φx〉E ,
where {|ψx〉} forms an orthonormal set for the system
A′, and thus ΥAA′ has the form in Eq. (2).
Conversely, we now assume that for any bipartite split
{P1,P2} of the players with |P1| = M ≥ 2, the given
state ΥAA′ is of the form in Eq. (2). Then it can be
readily checked that players have secret information that
satisfies the condition (i) by measuring their secret parts
in the computational basis. It remains to show that the
secret information satisfies the condition (ii′).
Suppose that P1 and P2 are parties of legitimate
players and dishonest players, respectively. Let σA′ =∑
x λx |µx〉 〈µx| be a spectral decomposition of σA′ , and
|ΨI1I2〉A′E =
∑
x
√
λxU
I1
P′
1
V I2
A′
|µx〉A′ |νx〉E ,
where {|νx〉E} is an orthonormal set for the system E.
Then we can see that the state of the form in Eq. (5) is
a purification of ΥAA′ .
Let I1 ∈ SαM be the legitimate players’ measurement
outcome after measuring their secret parts, then the
eavesdropper and dishonest players’ state after the mea-
surement becomes
ΥI1
P2P
′
2
E
=
1
dN−M−1
∑
I2,I
′
2
∈Sd−αN−M
|I2〉P2 〈I ′2|
⊗trP′
1
|ΨI1I2〉A′E 〈ΨI1I′2 |
for 2 ≤ M ≤ N − 1 and ΥI1E = trA′ |ΨI1〉A′E 〈ΨI1 | for
M = N . Since this state does not depend on the unitary
operator U I1
P′
1
, ΥI1
P2P
′
2
E
= Υ
I′1
P2P
′
2
E
for any I1, I
′
1 ∈ SαM .
This means that the legitimate players’ secret informa-
tion is secure against dishonest players and eavesdrop-
per.
As seen in Eq. (6), unitary operators on the shield
part of the GSS state can be expressed as the product of
unitary operators acting on two players’ shield parts.
Corollary 2. For any rearranged order l1l2 · · · lN , the
GSS state can be written as
1
dN−1
∑
I,J∈S0N
|I〉Al1Al2 ···AlN 〈J | ⊗ UIσA′U
†
J , (7)
where UI = U
il1 ,il2
A′
l1
A′
l2
U
jl2 ,il3
A′
l2
A′
l3
· · ·U jlN−1 ,ilN
A′
lN−1
A′
lN
for some uni-
tary operators U
il1 ,il2
A′
l1
A′
l2
, U
jl2 ,il3
A′
l2
A′
l3
, · · ·U jlN−1 ,ilN
A′
lN−1
A′
lN
with jlt ≡
il1 + · · ·+ ilt (mod d).
Let us now investigate the properties of the GSS state.
We remark that if N players share the N -party GHZ
state, then any M players among the total players can
share the M -party GHZ state by all players’ LOCC. We
can see from the following theorem that the GSS state
has the similar property.
Theorem 3. Suppose that players share a GSS state
ΥAA′ . Then for any bipartite split {P1,P2} of the play-
ers with |P1| = M ≥ 2, P1 can share a GSS state by
means of LOCC.
Proof. Let us divide P1 into legitimate players’ party PL
and dishonest players’ party PD with |PL| = K ≥ 2. By
rearranging the order, let PL = {Al1 , · · · ,AlK}, PD =
4{AlK+1 , · · · ,AlM }, and P2 = {AlM+1 , · · · ,AlN }. Since
ΥAA′ is a GSS state, it follows from the Corollary 2 that
ΥAA′ is written as in Eq. (7).
Assume that players in P2 measure their secret parts
in the computational basis, and have the measurement
outcome I2 = mlM+1 · · ·mlN ∈ SβN−M . Then jlK =
d − β − (ilK+1 + · · · + ilM ), jlM = d − β, and the post-
measurement state becomes as follows:
1
dM−1
∑
ILID ,JLJD∈S
d−β
M
|ILIDI2〉PLPDP2 〈JLJDI2|
⊗
(
U IL
P′
L
V ID
P′
1
W I2
A′
)
σA′
(
UJL
P′
L
V JD
P′
1
W I2
A′
)†
,
where
U IL
P′
L
= U
il1 ,il2
A′
l1
A′
l2
U
jl2 ,il3
A′
l2
A′
l3
· · ·U jlK−1 ,ilK
A′
lK−1
A′
lK
,
V ID
P′
1
= U
jlK ,ilK+1
A′
lK
A′
lK+1
U
jlK+1 ,ilK+2
A′
lK+1
A′
lK+2
· · ·U jlM−1 ,ilM
A′
lM−1
A′
lM
,
and
W I2
A′
= U
jlM ,mlM+1
A′
lM
A′
lM+1
U
jlM+1 ,mlM+2
A′
lM+1
A′
lM+2
· · ·U jlN−1 ,mlN
A′
lN−1
A′
lN
.
By tracing out the P2’s system, we can see that P1’s state
is written as
1
dM−1
∑
ILID ,JLJD∈S
d−β
M
|ILID〉PLPD 〈JLJD|
⊗
(
U IL
P′
L
V ID
P′
1
)
σ˜P′
1
(
UJL
P′
L
V JD
P′
1
)†
for some state σ˜P′
1
. Hence, after one of players Ak in P1
applies unitary operator Tβ =
∑
i |i+ β〉 〈i| on his/her
secret part, their state becomes a GSS state.
Since quantum networks in general require repeaters
connecting players because of the distance limitation of
quantum communication, and players want to get a se-
cure information without providing their information to
repeaters, this property can play an important role in
quantum networks. Hence, in quantum networks, shar-
ing a GSS state can be a goal for secure multipartite
quantum communication.
The next property is about a relation between the GSS
state and the Holevo information [12], which is one of the
important quantities in security analysis. Suppose that
Alice and Bob share a state ρAB, and Alice measures her
system. For each Alice’s measurement outcome x, let px
and ρxB be its probability and Bob’s resulting state after
her measurement, respectively. The Holevo information
between Alice’s measurement outcomes and Bob’s state
is given by
χρ(x : B) = S(ρ¯)−
∑
x
pxS(ρ
x
B),
where S is the von Neumann entropy and ρ¯ =
∑
x pxρ
x
B.
Zero Holevo information between Alice’s measurement
outcomes and Bob’s state, that is, χρ(x : B) = 0 means
that Bob cannot have any information about Alice’s mea-
surement outcomes. Thus, the modified condition (ii′)
can be replaced as follows: For a given quantum state Υ,
χΥ(kl : DE) = 0 for any party DE of dishonest players
and eavesdropper, where kl is the the legitimate player
Al’s secret information. In other words, the Holevo in-
formation is zero if and only if the state satisfying the
condition (i) for secret sharing is a GSS state. For exam-
ple, since χ(i1 : A3) = 1 in Eq. (1), where i1 is the A1’s
measurement outcome when he/she measures his/her se-
cret part in the computational basis, the secret-sharing
state in Eq. (1) is not a GSS state.
Theorem 4. Let ΓAA′ be a quantum state and pI be
the probability that players’ measurement outcome is I
when they measure the system A in the computational
basis. Suppose that pI > 0 for I ∈ S0N and pI = 0
for I /∈ S0N . Then ΓAA′ is a GSS state if and only
if for any D ⊂ {A1, · · · ,AN} with |D| = N − 2, the
Holevo information χΓ(ik : DE) equals zero, where ik
is the measurement outcome of the Ak’s secret part and
Ak /∈ D.
Proof. We show that pI ’s are identical for all I ∈ S0N if
for any D ⊂ {A1, · · · ,AN} with |D| = N − 2, χΓ(ik :
DE) = 0, where ik is the measurement outcome of Ak /∈
D. If it is true, then Theorem 1 completes the proof.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that D =
{A3, · · · ,AN}, and χΓ(ik : DE) = 0 for k = 1, 2. Note
that the following state is a purification of the given state:
|Ψ〉A1A2DA′E =
d−1∑
i1,i2=0
|i1, i2〉A1A2 |ψi1,i2〉DA′E ,
where D is the secret part of D and
|ψi1,i2〉DA′E =
∑
ξ∈S
−i1−i2
N−2
√
pi1,i2,ξ |ξ〉D |Ψi1,i2,ξ〉A′E .
When A1’s measurement outcome is i, the state of D and
eavesdropper can be described as
ρi1=iDE =
1
qi
d−1∑
i2=0
trA′
1
A′
2
|ψi,i2〉DA′E 〈ψi,i2 | ,
where qi =
∑
i2
∑
ξ∈S
−i−i2
N−2
pi,i2,ξ. Since the Holevo in-
formation χΓ(i1 : DE) equals zero, ρi1=iDE = ρi1=i
′
DE for any
A1’s measurement outcomes i and i′. Similarly, since
χΓ(i2 : DE) = 0, we also have ρi2=jDE = ρi2=j
′
DE for any
A2’s measurement outcomes j and j′, where
ρi2=jDE =
1
rj
d−1∑
i1=0
trA′
1
A′
2
|ψi1,j〉DA′E 〈ψi1,j|
5with rj =
∑
i1
∑
ξ∈S
−i1−j
N−2
pi1,j,ξ. Thus, if i + j = i
′ + j′
(mod d),
pi,j,ξ
pi′,j′,ξ
=
qi
qi′
=
rj
rj′
for ξ ∈ S−i−jN−2 . In particular, since
qα
qβ
=
pα,β−α,ξ
pβ,0,ξ
=
rβ−α
r0
=
pα−β,β−α,ζ
p0,0,ζ
=
qα−β
q0
for ξ ∈ SβN−2 and ζ ∈ S0N−2, we obtain
qβ = qβ
d−1∑
α=0
qα−β = q0
d−1∑
α=0
qα = q0
for any β ∈ Zd, that is, qi’s are all equal. Hence, if
i + j = i′ + j′ (mod d), then pi,j,ξ = pi′,j′,ξ for all ξ ∈
S
−i−j
N−2 . By symmetry, it follows that pI ’s are identical
for all I ∈ S0N .
Theorem 4 shows that players’ secret information must
be unbiased in order to be secure against dishonest play-
ers and eavesdropper. Therefore, the condition (ii′) of the
modified secret-sharing conditions includes unbiasedness
of the players’ secret information, and so the unbiased-
ness can be omitted in the condition (i) of the modified
conditions.
III. GSS DISTILLABLE RATE
In this section, we discuss the distillable rate with re-
spect to the GSS state. Before defining the distillable
rate, we need to consider one issue arising from the pres-
ence of dishonest players. For instance, let us look at the
secret-sharing state in Eq. (1) once more. For α, β ∈ C
with |α|2 + |β|2 = 1, if we let |µ0〉 = α |0〉 + β |1〉 and
|µ1〉 = β∗ |0〉 − α∗ |1〉, the state can be written as
1
2
|µ0〉A1 |0〉A2 |00〉A′1A′2
(
α∗ |00〉A3A′3 + β
∗ |11〉A3A′3
)
+
1
2
|µ0〉A1 |1〉A2 |00〉A′1A′2
(
α∗ |10〉A3A′3 + β
∗ |01〉A3A′3
)
+
1
2
|µ1〉A1 |0〉A2 |00〉A′1A′2
(
β |00〉A3A′3 − α |11〉A3A′3
)
+
1
2
|µ1〉A1 |1〉A2 |00〉A′1A′2
(
β |10〉A3A′3 − α |01〉A3A′3
)
.
Hence, for any A1’s measurement basis {|µ0〉 , |µ1〉},
playerA3 can get the other players’ secret information by
properly measuring his/her system. However, since this
is a secret-sharing state, it is GHZ distillable [8], that is,
the GHZ state can be asymptotically distilled from the
state by LOCC. Thus, if we define the distillable rate
as how many copies of the given state are required to
asymptotically distill a GSS state through LOCC, the
completely insecure quantum state may have a strictly
positive rate.
In order to avoid such an issue, we employ the Devetak-
Winter rate [13, 14]. Let ρA1···AN be a given state. We
say that ρA1···AN has positive Devetak-Winter rate if
there is a set of measurement operations {Mk}1≤k≤N
such that for any D ⊂ {A1, · · · ,AN} with |D| ≤ N − 2,
I (mi : m¯i) − χρ (mi : DE) > 0, where I (X : Y ) is the
mutual information between X and Y , Ai /∈ D, mi is
the Ai’s measurement outcome, and m¯i is the sum of
the measurement outcomes of players except Ai. If we
define the distillable rate only for quantum states with
positive Devetak-Winter rate, then we can rule out quan-
tum states that are completely insecure.
Definition 1. For given state ρA1···AN with positive
Devetak-Winter rate, let Pn be a sequence of LOCC
operations such that Pn (ρ
⊗n) = σn. We call P ≡⋃∞
n=1 {Pn} a GSS distillation protocol of the state ρ if
limn→∞ ‖σn − Υdn‖ = 0, where Υdn is a GSS state that
has a secret part with dimension dNn . For given protocol
P, its rate is defined as
R(P) = lim sup
n→∞
log dn
n
,
and the GSS distillable rate of the state ρ is given by
DG(ρ) = sup
P
R(P).
We note that when players are divided into two parties,
P1 and P2, they can have a private state between two
parties if they share a GSS state. Thus, we have
DG (ρA1···AN ) ≤ KP1:P2D (ρA1···AN ) ,
where KP1:P2D is the distillable key rate between P1
and P2, which is defined by protocols to distill private
states [7]. In addition, since the relative entropy of en-
tanglement (REE) is an upper bound of the distillable
key rate [7], we obtain
DG (ρA1···AN ) ≤ EP1:P2r (ρA1···AN ) , (8)
where EP1:P2r is REE between P1 and P2, that is,
EP1:P2r (ρ) = inf
σ∈SEPP1:P2
S(ρ‖σ).
Here, S(ρ‖σ) = −S(ρ)−Trρ log σ is the relative entropy,
and SEPP1:P2 is the set of bipartite separable states of
the system P1P2.
Using the GSS distillable rate, one can define irre-
ducible GSS state, as irreducible private state is defined
in Ref. [7]. For any GSS state ΥAA′ whose secret part
is of dimension dN , the state is said to be irreducible if
DG (ΥAA′) = log d. Then the following theorem provides
a way to check that a given GSS state is irreducible.
Theorem 5. Let ΥAA′ be a GSS state and A¯k denote
the party of players except Ak. If ΥAA′ is written as
ΥAkA¯kA′ =
1
dN−1
∑
ikI,jkJ∈S
0
N
|ikI〉AkA¯k 〈jkJ |
⊗
(
U I
A¯′
k
V ik
A′
)
σA′
(
UJ
A¯′
k
V jk
A′
)†
,
6where σA′ is a state on the system A
′, and A¯k and A¯
′
k
are the secret part and the shield part of A¯k, respectively,
then
EAk:A¯kr (Υ) ≤ log d+
1
d
∑
ik
EAk:A¯kr
(
V ik
A′
σA′
(
V ik
A′
)†)
.
(9)
Proof. Let us consider the unitary operator
WA¯kA¯′k ≡
∑
I∈ZN−1
d
|I〉
A¯k
〈I| ⊗
(
U I
A¯′
k
)†
.
Since the REE is invariant under local unitary operation,
EAk:A¯kr (Υ) = E
Ak:A¯k
r
(
WΥW †
)
. Note that
WΥW † =
1
d
∑
ik,jk
|ikψik〉AkA¯k 〈jkψjk | ⊗ V
ik
A′
σA′
(
V jk
A′
)†
,
where
|ψik〉A¯k =
1√
dN−2
∑
I∈S
−ik
N
|I〉
A¯k
.
Hence, we can regard WΥW † as a private state. By
Theorem 3 in Ref. [7], we can prove this theorem.
Combining inequalities (8) and (9), we have
DG (ΥAA′) ≤ log d+ 1
d
∑
ik
EAk:A¯kr
(
V ik
A′
σA′
(
V ik
A′
)†)
.
Hence, if there is a k such that
EAk:A¯kr
(
V ik
A′
σA′
(
V ik
A′
)†)
= 0
for all ik, the given GSS state is irreducible, since
DG (ΥAA′) ≥ log d.
IV. EXAMPLES
Example 1. Let us consider a quantum network consist-
ing of only private states. In order for each player to get
a secret bit for secret sharing in the network, all players
should be connected via private states. More precisely,
assume that Alice and Bob, Bob and Charlie, and Charlie
and Alice share the following private states:
γA1B2A′1B′2 =
1
2
1∑
i,i′=0
|ii〉A1B2 〈i′i′| ⊗ UiσA′1B′2U
†
i′ ,
γˆB1C2B′1C′2 =
1
2
1∑
j,j′=0
|jj〉B1C2 〈j′j′| ⊗ Uˆj σˆB′1C′2Uˆ
†
j′ ,
γ˜C1A2C′1A′2 =
1
2
1∑
k,k′=0
|kk〉C1A2 〈k′k′| ⊗ U˜kσ˜C′1A′2U˜
†
k′ ,
where σA′
1
B′
2
, σˆB′
1
C′
2
, and σ˜C′
1
A′
2
are arbitrary states, and
{Ui},
{
Uˆj
}
, and
{
U˜k
}
are unitary operators on the sys-
tem A′1B
′
2, B
′
1C
′
2, and C
′
1A
′
2, respectively. If m1 and m2
are measurement outcomes when they measure their key
parts 1 and 2 in the computational basis, respectively,
then m1 + m2 (mod 2) can be used as a secret bit for
secret sharing.
This secret bit can also be obtained from the
process where each player takes the unitary W ≡∑1
i,j=0 |i+ j, j〉 〈i, j| on his/her key parts, and measures
the first key part in the computational basis. After tak-
ing the unitary operators on their key parts, the state
becomes
Υ =
1
4
∑
ijk,i′j′k′∈S0
3
|ijk〉
P
〈i′j′k′| ⊗ V iVˆ kΛ
(
V i
′
Vˆ k
′
)†
=
1
4
∑
ijk,i′j′k′∈S0
3
|ijk〉
P
〈i′j′k′| ⊗ Vˆ j V˜ iΛ
(
Vˆ j
′
V˜ i
′
)†
=
1
4
∑
ijk,i′j′k′∈S0
3
|ijk〉
P
〈i′j′k′| ⊗ V˜ kV jΛ
(
V˜ k
′
V j
′
)†
,
where P = A1B1C1,
Λ =
1
2
1∑
l,l′=0
|lll〉A2B2C2 〈l′l′l′|
⊗ UlσA′
1
B′
2
U †l′ ⊗ UˆlσˆB′1C′2 Uˆ
†
l′ ⊗ U˜lσ˜C′1A′2 U˜
†
l′ ,
V 1B2A′1B′2 =
1∑
l=0
|l〉B2 〈l + 1| ⊗ UlU
†
l+1,
Vˆ 1C2B′1C′2 =
1∑
l=0
|l〉C2 〈l + 1| ⊗ UˆlUˆ
†
l+1,
V˜ 1A2C′1A′2 =
1∑
l=0
|l〉A2 〈l + 1| ⊗ U˜lU˜
†
l+1,
and V 0, Vˆ 0 and V˜ 0 are identity operators. This is to
prepare the GSS state Υ so as to obtain a secret bit for
secret sharing.
One may think that sharing private states is enough
for players to carry out secret sharing. However, as we
can see above, it can be seen as a process of preparing
a GSS state from private states which share in advance
between every pair of the total players, and hence it can
be spatially inefficient because the second key parts of
the private states are not used in obtaining a secret bit.
Therefore, if it is possible to directly share a GSS state,
it can be more efficient and more productive than shar-
ing private states when players want to perform secret
sharing.
7Example 2. As in Refs. [7, 8], it can be an interesting task
to find a GSS state with low distillable entanglement. To
this end, let us first consider the following state:
Γ =a0 |ψ0〉ABC 〈ψ0| ⊗ (ρ0 ⊗ σ0 ⊗ τ0)
+ a1 |ψ1〉ABC 〈ψ1| ⊗ (ρ1 ⊗ σ0 ⊗ τ1)
+ a2 |ψ2〉ABC 〈ψ2| ⊗ (ρ1 ⊗ σ1 ⊗ τ0)
+ a3 |ψ3〉ABC 〈ψ3| ⊗ (ρ0 ⊗ σ1 ⊗ τ1) ,
where |ψ0〉 = 12 (|000〉+ |011〉+ |101〉+ |110〉), |ψ1〉 =
ZA |ψ0〉, |ψ2〉 = ZB |ψ0〉, |ψ3〉 = ZC |ψ0〉, and ρi, σj , and
τk have orthogonal supports on the system A
′
1B
′
2, B
′
1C
′
2,
and C′1A
′
2, respectively. Then we can find unitary oper-
ators UA′
1
B′
2
, VB′
1
C′
2
, and WC′
1
A′
2
that satisfy UA′
1
B′
2
ρi =
(−1)iρi, VB′
1
C′
2
σj = (−1)jσj , and WC′
1
A′
2
τk = (−1)kτk.
Using these operators, it can be shown that Γ is a GSS
state.
We now consider the state
Γ =p |ψ0〉 〈ψ0| ⊗ (̺s ⊗ σ0 ⊗ ̺s)
+ p |ψ1〉 〈ψ1| ⊗ (̺a ⊗ σ0 ⊗ ̺a)
+
(
1
2
− p
)
|ψ2〉 〈ψ2| ⊗ (̺a ⊗ σ1 ⊗ ̺s)
+
(
1
2
− p
)
|ψ3〉 〈ψ3| ⊗ (̺s ⊗ σ1 ⊗ ̺a) ,
where ̺s and ̺a are symmetric and antisymmetric
Werner states [15]
̺s =
I + F
d2 + d
,
̺a =
I − F
d2 − d
with identity operator I on the d⊗ d system and the flip
operator F =∑d−1i,j=0 |ij〉 〈ji|. It follows from tedious but
straightforward calculations that
∥∥∥ΓTAA′1A′2∥∥∥
1
= 1 +
(
2
d2
+
2
d
)
(1 + 2p),
where ‖ · ‖1 is the trace norm. Since the distillable en-
tanglement is upper bounded by the log negativity [16]
EN (Γ) = log2
∥∥∥ΓTAA′1A′2
∥∥∥
1
, we can construct the GSS
state that has arbitrarily low bipartite distillable entan-
glement between Alice and the rest of players by increas-
ing d.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have presented the GSS state, and ex-
plored its properties. The GSS state provides a classical
information for (n, n)-threshold secret sharing, which is
secure against dishonest players and eavesdropper. Fur-
thermore, if N players share an N -party GSS state,
LOCC enables arbitraryM players out of the total play-
ers to share anM -party GSS state. We have also defined
the GSS distillable rate, and it has been shown that the
REE between any bipartition of the total players is an
upper bound on the GSS distillable rate.
The GSS state can be regarded as a generalization of
the private state with respect to secret sharing. In ad-
dition, when players share a GSS state, any two play-
ers among them can share a private state by all players’
LOCC. Thus, by applying various research results related
to the private state, the results can also be used to in-
vestigate multipartite communication.
In a quantum network, if players share a GSS state, any
arbitrary parties of players can perform QKD or quantum
secret sharing. We can naturally have the following ques-
tion: Is the GSS state the only quantum state on which
players can do them? If we answer this question, we can
have a more in-depth discussion of the secure quantum
network.
There are interesting future works related to the GSS
state. First, we can think about a bound entangled state
with positive GSS distillable rate. If we find such a state,
it can help us to study the relationship between distillable
multipartite entanglement and the GSS distillable rate
in detail. Second, it can be an intriguing task to find a
way to share a GSS state between players and repeaters
in quantum networks. If there exists such a way, we
can construct a quantum network that ensures secure
multipartite communication among players. Therefore
the GSS state could be considered as a new resource in
multipartite quantum communication.
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